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1 
Farm commodity programs have been a major component of U.S. 
agricultural policy for more than fifty years. The federal government 
first implemented these programs during the 1930's to help small 
farmers maintain their lifestyles. Supply control measures such as 
acreage reduction programs increased farm income by keeping commodity 
prices artificially high. In addition, other policies were designed to 
help reduce possible financial risks and losses involved in farming by 
guaranteeing a minimum support price. Although the emergency 
conditions of the Great Depression no longer exist, the federal 
government has continued to rely upon these orignial commodity programs 
to deal with agriculture's basic problem of overproduction. 
In the short run, farm commodity programs have been successful in 
increasing farm income and prices but have failed to solve the 
underlying problem of overproduction. Ironically, these measures have 
operated in the opposit manner, not only stimulating production in the 
long run, but also causing production to be less efficient than what it 
would be in a free market setting. Due to resource combinations below 
the optimal level, commodities are produced at a higher cost to society 
and inefficiencies arise. 
In addition to this problem of inefficient use of resources, 
agricultural commodity programs have caused some equity and 
distributional problems over the years. For example, due to price 
supports and land retirement programs which have increased the prices 
of American commodities relative to the world, the level of exports has 
been below that which would be found in a free market. Another problem 
resulting from these measures is that the programs have actually 
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benefited the large farm operator, rather than the small farmer as 
orignally intended by directly tying the amount of benefit to farm size 
and output. Furthermore, the problem of escalating land prices can be 
attributed to agricultural commodity programs since benefits from these 
programs have been capitalized into land values. Finally, these 
programs have been a growing burden on the federal budget as programs' 
costs and cash benefits to farmers have risen. Nevertheless, the 
federal government has continued to implement these measures despite 
these negative secondary effects. 
The purpose of this paper is to measure the economic 
inefficiencies caused by federal acreage reduction programs. This 
measurement of inefficiency found by using an econometric model of the 
feed grain sector, will be used to help support the belief that farm 
commodity programs which the federal government has continually 
sponsored, do not serve as long term solutions to agriculture's 
historical problem of overproduction. Furthermore, it will support the 
view that alternative approaches such as returning agriculture to a 
more laissez faire, free market structure, would be more efficient and 
should replace present policies. 
To develp this thesis, the paper will be divided into three 
secitons. Section I will give a description and background information 
on the major types of farm commodity programs which have been sponsored 
by the federal government. This will enable the reader to get a better 
understanding about farm commodity programs and their effects. Next, 
Section II will examine the most recent acreage reduction program, the 
1983 Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program and its effects on farmers as well 
as other members of society. PIK was chosen not only to exemplify the 
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impact of supply control measures on the economy, but also to emphasize 
that this "new" farm canmodity programs was actually not new, but 
merely another acreage reduction program, like those originally 
implemented in the 1930's. Finally, Section III will attempt to 
measure the inefficiencies resulting fran the federal government's 
acreage reduction programs using an econanetric model applied to the 
feed grain sector. This estimate will be used to show that supply 
control programs are not efficient measures, nor do they solve the farm 
sector's overproduction problem. 
SECTION I 
TYPES OF FARM COMMODITY PROGRAMS 
Over the years, three basic types of agricultural commodity 
programs have been used by the federal government to raise farm prices 
and incomes. As can be seen in Figure 1(a), the first type of farm 
program, price supports, uses a price floor to increase commodity 
prices. The floor price, P', is greater than the equilibrium price, P, 
and therefore, stimulates overproduction. Quantity increases fran Q to 
Q', causing disequilibrium since quantity supplied is greater than 
quantity demanded. 
The second program type represented in Figure 1(b), increases 
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4 
demand to raise farm prices, shown here as a shift from D to D'. These 
demand expansion measures increase not only quantity supplied and 
demanded from Q to Q', but also increase commodity price from P to P' • 
The third type of program uses production controls to reduce 
commodity supply in order to increase prices. Figure l(c) shows the 
effect of these supply-reducing measures as price rises from P to P' 
and quantity decreases from Q to Q', due to an upward shift in the 
supply curve from S to S'. 
PRICE SUPPORTS 
Price supports, the first type of commodity program, have been 
used to reduce producers' financial risks by guaranteeing a stable, 
minimum commodity price through nonrecourse loans. Originally, this 
measure was designed "to increase and then stabilize commodity prices 
by setting loan rates above the average weather crop levels at certain 
percentages of parity prices." 1 This parity price was defined as the 
price that would give the commodity the same buying power in terms of 
goods and services bought by farmers that the commodity had in the 
1910-14 base period. This standard has been considered over the years 
as the "fair" price that farmers deserve to be paid for their output. 
Today, however, this parity price standard has been replaced with a 
cost-of-production measure. 
Recently, the level of price support has varied from year to year 
since prior to each planting season the Secretary of Agriculture 
announces a new support price. Farmers who participate in the program 
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have the opportunity to obtain nonrecourse loans. To do so, the farmer 
must comply with planting restrictions and store the commodity pledged 
for the loan in a government-approved facility which is used as 
collateral for a loan at the support level rate. When the loan comes 
due, the farmer generally has three alternatives: (1) to deliver the 
commodity to the CCC as full repayment of the loan, (2) to renew the 
loan for another year, or (3) to repay the loan in cash and resume 
control over his crop. The first alternative is chosen only when the 
market price falls below the support rate, thereby providing farmers 
with a guaranteed base price. These commodities are then stored and 
become part of the CCC-owned reserve stocks. The other alternatives 
are chosen when the market price is above the loan rate and accumulated 
interest charges. Therefore, price supports have allowed farmers to 
gain from any price rise without a risk of loss. 
DEMAND EXPANSION PROGRAMS 
Historically, supply control measures such as acreage reduction 
and price supports have been the predominant features of agricultural 
commodity programs. However, programs to increase demand, the second 
farm program type, can be found in various farm legislation such as the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480, 68 
Stat. 454; July 10, 1954), the Food Stamp Act (P.L. 525, 78 Stat. 703; 
August 31, 1964), and the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.; 60 
Stat. 230; June 4, 1946). These programs include research of new uses 
for farm products, policies to increase for~ign demand for U.S. 
commodities, and measures to increase domestic demand for surplus 
•
 
6 
crops. Nevertheless, demand expansion measures such as these are not 
considered by economists as viable long run solu1tions since they do 
not attempt to reduce overproduction. 
PRODUCTION CONTROLS 
The third program type, supply control, raises price and income by 
influencing the amount of land used for production through acreage 
reduction programs. In acreage reduction programs, the federal 
government reduces land usage by paying the producer to voluntarily 
set-aside or divert to conservation purposes, a certain number of acres 
normally used for production. Payments are made on a per acre basis 
and are determined using past yields of the crop that is usually 
planted on the retired land. The rationale behind this "input control" 
program is that the less land used for productive purposes will reduce 
total supply of the surplus commodity, thereby increasing not only the 
commodity price, but also farm income. Furthermore, by controlling the 
maximum number of acres which can be used for production, the federal 
government can try to keep supply more in line with demand on an annual 
basis, thereby keeping surplus stocks at a minimum. 
2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Present day commodity programs have descended directly from those 
farm programs implemented in the 1930's. Although these commodity 
programs have been slightly modified in the past 50 years, structurally 
thay have remained very similar to the original programs which were 
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designed to alleviate farm problems which peaked during the Great 
Depression. Prior to these programs, farmers had experienced extremely 
low prices and incomes but continued to expand production in an attempt 
to increase profits. 
Immediately upon becoming President in 1929, Herbert Hoover 
established the Federal Farm Board in the Agricultural Marketing Act 
(P.L. 11, February 10, 1929) of that year in hopes of helping farmers 
overcome the depressed conditions which existed in agriculture while 
the non-farm sector experienced wealth and abundance. Using loans, 
this board attempted to stabilize prices by controlling surpluses. 
Loans to farmer cooperatives were made in three ways: (l)acquiring 
excess supplies, (2)constructing new storage facilities to store 
surplus commodities, and (3)making advances to growers for their crops 
in order to support prices. However, due to a limited amount of funds 
to work with, the board's finances were soon exhausted without 
accomplishing its goals. After the board was dissolved and the 
Depression set in, prices fell substantially causing farmers to demand 
federal legislation either to control production or to limit quantities 
going to market. 
In	 response to declining net farm income which fell from $6.3 
Jbillion to $1.9 billion during the Hoover Administration, the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (P.L. 10, May 12, 1933) was 
designed to rescue the small farmer from bankruptcy. It provided 
provisions to adjust farm production to meet market demand, thereby 
reducing commodity surpluses and increasing farm prices. The act 
created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) which not only 
was authorized to enter into voluntary agreements with farmers who were 
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4paid to reduce acreage of the basic commodities, but also was 
permitted to regulate marketing through voluntary agreements. 
Furthermore, the act gave the AAA the authority to levy taxes on 
processors of commodities and to use these proceeds to pay for the cost 
of expanding markets. However, in 1936 the production controls and the 
processing tax features were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in the Hoosac -Mill decision (U.S. vs. Butler, 297 U.S. 1). 
Nevertheless, these features, in addition to others, were incorporated 
into the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (7 U.S.C.,52 Stat. 31; 
February 16, 1938). This legislation introduced the idea of 
nonrecourse loans to producers under certain market conditions and 
offered payments to farmers which would provide a return as close to 
parity as the available funds would permit. In later legislation, 
these parity prices were replaced with target prices and these returns 
became known as deficiency payments. 
The crisis conditions which existed during the Great Depression 
for agriculture were relieved with the beginning of World War II. 
Demand for U.S. farm products rose, reducing U.S. surpluses and driving 
prices to high levels. Farmers were encouraged to increase production 
through such patriotic appeals as "Food will win the war and write the 
Peace" ,5 while supply-control mechanisms of earlier legislation were 
discontinued. The Stabilization Act of 1942 (15 U.S.C., 56 Stat. 767; 
October 2, 1942) developed from the fear of what would happen to farm 
prices once the war ended. In order to prevent farm prices from 
immediately dropping, the act assured farmers that the prices of the 
basic commodities would be supported at a fixed 90% level of parity for 
two years after the war ended. However, these fixed price supports 
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were extended in the Agricultural Act of 1948 (P.L. 897, 62 Stat. 1247; 
July 3, 1948) and 1949 (P.L. 439, 63 Stat. 1051; October 31, 1949), 
although the Secretary of Agriculture at that time, Charles F. Brannan, 
unsuccessfully submitted to Congress a new farm program. The purpose 
of Brannan's plan was to achieve income equity for farmers by shifting 
from the traditional parity price standard used in the price support 
programs to an income standard. It placed a greater emphasis on a free 
market structure since supply and demand forces would be allowed to 
determine the price of the commodities. Price supports would be 
replaced with supplemental payments made by the federal government 
based on the difference between the farmer's income in the free market 
setting and an acceptable income level determined by the government. 
Consumers would be able to purchase food at a cheaper price while all 
farmers would be guaranteed a minimum income. However, this plan would 
have substantially increased government cost, which was one of the 
reasons that it failed in Congress. 
Fixed price supports at high levels could not continue as 
surpluses mounted and prices fell. Once again war, this time the 
Korean conflict, proved to be beneficial to the agricultural sector by 
strengthening the demand for farm products. After the war ended, 
however, fixed price supports again were continued while a debate grew 
as to whether these supports should be fixed or flexible. Surpluses 
were accumulating and immediate action was needed as storage facilities 
overflowed. For example, toward the end of the Korean War in 1952, 
CCC-owned stocks of wheat were at a postwar low of 256 million bushels 
while only two years later, stocks swelled to 933 million bushels. 6 
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, To prevent further overproduction. acreage control measures of the 
1930's were re-introduced in legislation passed in 1956. The Soil Bank 
was established in the Agricultural Act of that year (P.L. 540. 70 
Stat. 188. May 28. 1956). This was the first nation-wide effort to 
bring production of agricultural products in line with demand. It was 
a large scale. voluntary program aimed at reducing output through both 
short- and long-term land retirement. The act was divided into two 
provisions--the Acreage Reserve and the Conservation Reserve. The 
short-term land retirement plan. the Acreage Reserve. was designed to 
reduce production of basic commodities by restricting the amount of 
land used for their production while meanwhile maintaining farmers' 
incomes. Through formal contracts. participating farmers agreed to take 
a certain percentage of their land out of production and to not harvest 
any other crop on the land during that year. In return. the farmer 
would receive a land-rental payment at least equal to the net income 
the farmer would have earned from the land put into the reserve. The 
other provision established the Conservation Reserve which was a long 
term general land retirement program aimed at conserving soil. water. 
and wildlife. Farmers were paid to divert all or a part of their 
cropland to soil-conserving uses under long-term contracts of five to 
ten years. Payments were two-fold--an annual per-acre rental payment 
and a cost-sharing payment for carrying out the conservation measures. 
Because these per-acre rental rates were low. farmers tended to put 
only their marginal. less productive land into the reserve. Meanwhile. 
the federal government had paid these land owners for not producing on 
land which was unfit for growing crops and which possibly would not 
have ,been used for production purposes. 
11 
Attempts to redirect farm policy occurred during the early part of 
the 1960's as output per man-hour and output per acre rose. Willard 
Cochrane, the chief economic advisor for the Secretary of Agriculture 
during the Kennedy years, formulated a mandatory supply management plan 
which "would be a deliberate restriction of farm supplies with a view 
to ra i s i ng f arm pr i ces and i ncomes. .. 7 Members 0 f t he agricultural 
committees in Congress introduced Cochrane's idea of federal marketing 
orders for all surplus commodities in the Cochrane Bill of 1961. These 
marketing orders were to be a government determined maximum amount that 
each producer would be allowed to sell. Although the bill did not 
pass, it did bring to the public's attention the idea of mandatory 
supply management as a means to reduce surpluses and to raise commodity 
prices. 
In the early 1970's federal farm policy changed in response to 
excess global demand for food due to rising population and low 
agricultural production abroad. To meet expanding demand, the 
competitive market system again was allowed to operate in the 
agricultural sector with only a few production controls. Programs were 
implemented which reduced many of the government controls and 
restrictions, allowing farmers greater flexibility and more 
decision-making power. The Agriculture Act of 1970 (P.L. 524; 84 Stat. 
1358, November 30, 1970) suspended the earlier program measures which 
included marketing quotas and acreage allotments for wheat, cotton, and 
feed grains. Instead, the act relaxed planting restrictions by not 
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including a limit on acreage of any particular crop. However, in order 
to qualify for the price support program, one supply control provision 
did require a reduction in the total acreage devoted to all crops, 
called "set-asides". Program participants were required to set-aside 
from crop production a percentage of the national land diversion 
requirement computed by the U.S.D.A. The remaining cropland was then 
available for the farmer's chosen use. This provision gave farmers 
more control in decisions affecting their farms and also encouraged 
increased production as farmers brought land into production which 
formerly had not been used. Also, exports and prices increased which 
further encouraged farmers to buy more land and machinery and to 
increase production. 
Farm policy drastically changed in 1972 under the leadership of 
the new Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz. During this period all 
government-owned storage bins which held surplus stock were sold and 
many acreage control restrictions were abolished or substantially 
reduced. Two new concepts, target prices and deficiency payments, were 
introduced in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 
(P.L.86; 87 Stat. 221; August 10, 1973). Target prices were a minimum 
level of prices for specific commodities established by the federal 
government and were based on a pre-determined percentage of parity 
which was later replaced in 1977 with an average cost-of-production 
standard. Deficiency payments were paid by the government when the 
average market price fell below these target prices. These were the 
first steps to a market-oriented, reduced government farm policy. 
However, demand eventually decreased and surpluses again mounted, 
renewing the need for federal production controls. A number of programs 
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were initiated by the federal government between 1977 and 1982 but were 
unsuccessful in significantly reducing commodity overproduction. In 
1983 the D.S.D.A. formulated PIK. a type of acreage reduction program. 
in response to growing farm surpluses which had be caused by weak 
domestic demand. declining exports. and record high 1981 and 1982 
harvests. In the short run. PIK was successful in reducing surplus 
stocks and production. but its success was attributed more to the 
drought conditions during this growing season than to the actual 
program itself. 
Although this has been a very brief discussion of farm programs 
prior to the 1983 PIK program. the similarities of the programs can be 
detected. The basic philosophy that government intervention in the 
agricultural sector is needed to adjust commodity supply in order to 
maintain acceptable prices still dominates present commodity programs. 
Farm legislation first enacted in the 1930's has been extended to the 
present with only a few minor modifications. During this period. farm 
policies have focused on restricting the production and supply of 
agricultural commodities. thereby raising farm prices and incomes. 
However. measures to expand demand have been incorporated in some farm 
legislation as a means of reducing commodity surpluses. Nevertheless. 
all of these farm programs have been inherently shortsighted and 
unsuccessful in solving the underlying farm problem of overproduction. 
As a result of the inability of these programs to encompass the future. 
inefficiencies and other secondary problems in the agricultural sector 
have surfaced in the long run which will now be discussed in the 
following pages. 
..
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(l)AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION CONTROLS CAUSE ECONOMIC
 
INEFFICIENCIES TO ARISE
 
Although acreage reduction programs and price supports were 
designed to reduce production and therefore, supply of surplus 
commodities in the long run, the opposite has occurred. Output has not 
been significantly reduced in the long run by these measures, but 
instead has caused inefficient resource combinations. For example, 
land retirement programs have been criticized as being ineffective in 
reducing overproduction in the long run for they encourage farmers to 
intensify production on their unrestricted land. Although the number 
of acres used for production has been reduced by these programs, output 
per acre has grown as farmers have increased usage of fertilizer, farm 
machinery, hybrid seeds, and insecticides as well as using new 
technology and farming practices, such as reduced spacing between rows. 
Thus, projected decline in supply due to less cropland used for 
production has in the long run, been slightly off-set by increased 
yields per acre. Furthermore, output has not been significantly 
reduced in the long run for some land which has been retired or 
diverted has been marginally poor and unproductive. Acres enrolled in 
the program have been land which normally would not have been used for 
production. An example of this is the Soil Bank Program which by 1960 
8 
had retired approximately 27 million acres. In that year acreage in 
crops had declined by nearly the same amount of 25.3 million acres. 
• 
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However, the decline in acreage harvested was only 12.1 million acres 
which is less than half as much as the 28.7 million acres originally 
enrolled in the program. Although most of the small decline in acreage 
harvested can be explained by weather conditions returning to normal 
after a period of droughts, it did appear that in certain areas of the 
United States, some land that actually was not used for farming was put 
into the program. 
Over the years, price supports and target prices have also 
stimulated overproduction. Price supports have reduced farmers' risk 
of financial loss since a minimum loan payment is guaranteed which 
encourages farmers to produce, rather than to not produce. Also, price 
supports greater than the equilibrium market price have held and 
attracted resources to farming, resulting in further accumulation of 
surpluses and to inefficient allocation of resources. Furthermore, 
although target prices have allowed a greater market role in 
determining prices and output, they also have insured the farmer of a 
minimum deficiency payment and further stimulated production beyond 
society's needs. 
Due to these production controls which require the farmer to 
substitute other inputs for land, nonoptimal combination of resources 
results. Inefficiencies arise because the commodity is produced at a 
higher cost to society since the farmer is using a combination of 
productive resources below his optimal level. Furthermore, price 
supports and target prices for surplus commodities stimulate 
overproduction which also distorts resourse allocation. 
9Figure 2 exemplifies the effect of production control programs 
and the inefficiencies which arise from them. In a free market where 
FIGURE 2
 
PRICE 
s 
p 
B 
Q 
I 
[ 
I 
r 
D I 
I 
Quantity 
1 
•
 
16 
government does not intervene with agricultural production, the supply 
of feed grain would be the curve denoted by 5. Given the demand for 
these commodities as D, equilibrium would be at point E where quantity 
is Q and price is P1 • Upon implementation of an acreage reduction 
program such as PIK, the supply curve would rotate up to 5' and the new 
equilibrium would be at point E'. Q is the minimum amount of feed 
grain that would be produced since farmers will always use a certain 
amount of land for production is the quantity and is the amount the 
government figures it must cut back in order to reduce quantity to Q2 . 
This is due to the fact that acreage reduction programs reduce 
production less than what is anticipated since farmers will increase 
productivity per acre and retire their less productive land. In 
addition, a price floor such as federal price supports which are set 
above the equilibrium price at P , can stimulate overproduction. At 
3 
this higher price, quantity supplied now increases to Q3 , while 
act.ual quantity demanded is only Q4. Due to overproduction caused by 
price supports and to the misallocation of resources found in acreage 
reduction programs, inefficiencies arise. The inefficiencies can be 
represented by the areas A and B in Figure 2. Area A is the welfare 
loss to society due to quantity supplied at a level below what is 
desired. In other words, Q1 is the socially optimal amount demanded 
in an unregulated market, but Q 2 is what is ac tually produced. This 
area represents the value of goods and services lost through these 
production controls. Area B is the technical inefficiency due to 
higher production costs. These higher costs are attributed to 
inefficient resource combinations caused by the federal land 
restrictions. Together, these two areas represent the inefficiency 
-17 
arising from acreage reduction programs which this paper will attempt 
to measure. 
(2)	 COMMODITY PROGRAMS HAVE INCREASED THE PRICE OF U.S.
 
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS RELATIVE TO THE WORLD
 
Acreage control measures have sought to reduce output and trim 
excess supplies in order to maintain a high price for farmers. 
Furthermore, price supports have guaranteed a minimum commodity price 
and have led to higher market prices for all farmers. Consequently, 
these programs have resulted in an export price for U.S. commodities 
higher than the relative world price. Potential foreign demand for 
these products is reduced due to the higher price. The U.S. government 
has responded by employing various export subsidies. These subsidies 
make the price of U.S. commodities comparable to world prices and 
therefore, more competitive. However, policies such as P.L. 480, have 
increased international trade barriers since other exporting nations 
feel that the U.S. is "dumping" its surplus commodities in 
less-developed foreign nations. In retaliation, other exporting 
nations such as England, have enacted trade restrictions on the U.S. 
(3)	 DISTRIBUTION OF FARM PROGRAM BENEFITS ARE INEQUITABLE SINCE 
THE LARGEST FARMS GET THE MOST BENEFIT S 
-18 
Benefits from supply control programs are directly linked to the 
size of the farm and the amount of production. Therefore, the farmer 
who is able to produce larger quantities of the commodity is eligible 
to receive a higher loan from the price support program or a greater 
total deficiency payment since both of these payments are based upon 
the number of bushels produced or stored. Furthermore, acreage 
reduction programs favor the larger farmer who is able to set-aside a 
larger number of acres, thereby receiving a greater total diversion 
payment. Consequently, a very large fraction of the payments under 
these farm programs goes to families with incomes that are relatively 
high by most standards. 
U.S.D.A. economists have considered a more equitable system of 
payments, but a viable alternative has not been found. For example, a 
flat payment would encourage the small producer to stay in farming, 
perhaps increasing inefficiency. Furthermore, a maximum income 
restriction on the benefits would penalize those efficient farmers 
using economies of scale. Meanwhile, public concern over the present 
distribution of these payments arises since the possibility that money 
from low-income, nonfarm households may be being transferred to farm 
households with higher incomes. More alarming is the fact that these 
people who are subsidizing the larger, wealthier farmers through their 
tax dollars, are also consumers who are paying higher food prices 
caused fram the federal farm programs' supply-reducing measures. 
(4)	 LAND PRICES HAVE INCREASED LARGELY DUE TO ACREAGE REDUCTION 
PROGRAMS 
•
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Land values are determined by a number of factors including the 
desire to invest in land as a hedge against inflation or merely for an 
investment, the need for prestige, and the desire for security which is 
associated with owing land. In addition, one of the major factors is 
the return that is expected from the land. This depends not only upon 
the application of technology but also upon government price supports 
and acreage reduction programs. Benefits from these programs have been 
capitalizd into the price of land, causing the value of farm real 
estate to rise over the years. For example, a land buyer will be 
willing to pay more for land which is supported by the federal 
government through price supports as compared to land used for 
production of unsupported crops. Therefore, the seller of farm land 
will obtain a price which reflects not only the value of the land 
depending on its productivity, but also on its expected benefits from 
price supports. Consequently, many opponents of these farm programs 
argue that people such as hired farm labor and tenant farmers who are 
most in need of these benefits accruing to landowners, do not receive 
their fair share, therefore supporting their view that a change in 
agricultural policies is needed. 
(5) FARM PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN A GROWING DRAIN ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET 
The cost of agricultural commodity programs has increased over the 
years as these programs have been expanded to include more commodities 
as well as more farmers. Cash benefits to farmers have grown because 
20 
the federal government must offer higher land diversion payments and 
price supports in order to induce farmers to remove a sufficient amount 
of farm land as well as supply from the market. In addition, 
administration costs as well as storage costs have escalated in recent 
years as government-owned reserve stocks have substantially grown. As 
a result, the U.S.D.A. has had in the past few years the third largest 
department budget. For example, in 1982 the U.S.D.A. had a budget of 
10$48.3 billion. It employed 126,832 people directly and helped 
supervise or pay part of the salaries of 24,832 others. In addition, 
the U.S.D.A. was the government's biggest lender with nearly $125 
billion in loans outstanding of which $20 billion was directly 
attributed to price supports. Ironically, net farm income is only 
about half as much as the total amount the federal government spends on 
commodity programs. In other words, the federal government's 
expenditures on programs designed to increase farm income are higher 
than the actual net farm income figure. 
SECTION II 
Federal government officials are aware of these inherent 
weaknesses caused by supply control measures. As mentioned earlier, 
alternative plans have been proposed in the past by a few U.S.D.A. 
administrators as a way to overcome these inefficiencies. One meausure 
recently enacted was the 1983 Payment-In-Kind (PIK) Program which 
11introduced a different payment concept to farmers. Although this 
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program was advertised as a "new" farm program, it was merely another 
type of acreage reduction program. This shows that once again the 
federal government consistently has relied upon these measures as a 
means of solving the oversupply problem in agriculture, even though 
significant inefficiencies arise. The following section will examine 
this most recent type of acreage reduction program. 
THE 1983 PAYMENT-IN-KIND PROGRAM 
In January 1983, the U.S.D.A. announced a new supply control 
measure, the Payment-in-Kind Program (PIK) , in addition to the current 
voluntary acreage reduction and cash paid land diversion program. As 
mentioned earlier, PIK was simply another type of acreage reduction 
program but gave farmers greater incentive to participate, thereby 
encouraging farmers to further reduce 1983 crop acreage of wheat, corn, 
sorghum, upland cotton, and rice. Need for this action developed from 
growing farm surpluses which resulted from a weak domestic and foreign 
demand as well as from record high harvests in the previous two years. 
Consequently, this stock build-up caused sharply lower commodity 
prices, depressed farm income and increased government farm program 
expenditures. 
The distinctive feature of PIK was its payment-in-kind component. 
As payment for reducing planted acreage, the PIK program paid 
participating farmers in the actual commodity that would have been 
planted on acres enrolled in the program. Then, the farmer could sell 
or privately use on his farm the commodity received as payment. 
•
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Furthermore, PIK not only cut production of surplus crops, but also 
reduced accumulated surplus stocks in both the Commodity Credit 
12 
Corporation (CCC) held reserves and in farmer-owned reserves (FOR). 
The PIK program also was designed to achieve the following U.S.D.A. 
objectives: 
"(I) To minimize direct government outlays in support of 
agriculture 
(2) To improve conservation practices 
(3) To increase farm incomes 
13(4) To help to ease storage pr oblems" 
Earlier in 1982, the U.S.D.A. had announced a production control 
program for crops to be planted in the following spring. This Reduced 
Acreage Program (RAP) required participating farmers to idle up to 20% 
of their acreage base. Idled acres were required then to be put into 
conserving uses. This meant that a cover crop had to be planted to 
protect the land against weeds and soil erosion. Farmers enrolled in 
RAP were to be paid a cash land diversion payment equal to $1.50 per 
bushel times their normal yields on the first idled 10% of their 
14 
acreage base. The remaining 10% of their acreage base enrolled in 
RAP simply qualified the farmer for CCC loans and for deficiency 
payments which would be paid if the market price fell below the 
pre-announced target price. 
The PIK program allowed farmers who were participating in RAP to 
idle an additional 30% of their base acreage. Producers were paid an 
established percentage of their farm program yield per acre on the 
acres idled as long as they devoted this land to conservation purposes. 
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These repayment rates were 95% for wheat, and 80% for corn, sorghum, 
rice and cotton. For example, if a farmer who produced corn had a 
normal yield per acre of 100 bushels, his PIK payment would be equal to 
80 bushels/acre. Therefore, a farmer could receive a significant 
amount of the commodity that he normally would have planted on the 
idled acres, which then could be sold in the open market. 
Another alternative available to farmers under the PIK program was 
the whole-base retirement. This allowed the farmer to idle 100% of his 
base acreage, thereby not producing crops on any of his land. 
Participation in this option was determined on a bid basis whereby 
producers indicated the payback rate necessary to induce them to idle 
all of their crop base. Farmers could not submit a bid which was 
higher than the federal payback rate for the commodity which would have 
been planted on their land. In addition, participation in the 
whole-base retirement was limited since no more than 45% of a county's 
acreage base for each of the PIK crops could be idled. 
The PIK payments to participating growers were made through two 
different methods: (1) forgiveness of a loan under the farmer-owned 
reserve (FOR) or the nonrecouse loan program, or (2) receipt of an 
entitlement to eee-owned commodities. In the first alternative, the 
eee was allowed to liquidate its grain stocks by the amount forgiven by 
FOR and nonrecourse loans held by the participating producers in order 
to meet their PIK payments. In this case, no commodities would 
actually exchange hands. The second payment alternative allowed those 
farmers who did not hold FOR or reserve loans, or who did not have 
enough of a commodity under loan to meet their PIK compensation, to 
receive eee stock through a eee commodity certificate. This did result 
..
 
24 
in an actual physical movement of grain as well as a transfer of 
ownership. The recipient farmer then had the option to sell the 
commodity immediately or to store the crop and sell it at a future 
date. To promote orderly marketing so that not all of the PIK stock 
would be dumped on the market at the same time, the eee agreed to pay 
up to five months' storage expenses on PIK commodities received by the 
participating producer. 
Although PIK used a slightly different payment approach, it was 
still an acreage reduction program since farm income and commodity 
prices were increased by restricting the amount of land used for 
production. However, PIK did provide greater benefits and 
participation incentives for farmers as compared to earlier supply 
control programs. In addition to these standard production control 
measures which assure farmers a higher price than that found in a free 
market setting, the PIK program also guaranteed farmers a percentage of 
their normal yields. Therefore, the risk of financial loss was reduced 
by PIK since both high prices and yields were pledged by the federal 
government. In years where weather adversely affects production, such 
as the recent 1983 growing season, farmers would be much better off 
under a PIK program than under a regular acreage reduction program 
since the yield per acre guaranteed under PIK probably would be higher 
than the actual yield affected by the weather. Therefore, the farmer 
enrolled in PIK would benefit from receiving a yield greater than the 
average yield for the season affected by the poor weather. 
Additionally, the PIK farmer would receive a greater total payment 
since these guaranteed yields could then be sold at a higher market 
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price resulting from both the supply-reducing measures and the adverse 
weather. 
Another incentive to enroll in the 1983 PIK program was the dollar 
amount of benefits which a farmer was eligible to receive. Under 
earlier programs, a payment limitation of $50,000 was in effect for all 
farmers agreeing to reduce acreage. However, to provide additional 
incentives to idle cropland by participating in PIK, Congress abolished 
this payment limitation. Therefore, the farmer enrolled in PIK could 
receive a total cash benefit greater than that received from a regular 
acreage reduction program. 
Furthermore, enrollment in the PIK was enhanced by the greater 
expected increase in farm income resulting from reduced production 
costs. Variable costs of production would be lower for those farmers 
participating in PIK since money spent on inputs such as fertilizer, 
farm machinery, pesticides, seed and farm machinery repairs would be 
lower due to the smaller number of acres used for production. As can 
be seen in Appendix I, this allowed PIK farmers to obtain a higher 
total net farm income as compared to the alternative Reduced Acreage 
Program (RAP). As a result, farm equity for PIK participants could 
rise as farm income grew. Therefore, farmers who enrolled in PIK would 
have better ability to improve their financial position by reducing 
outstanding farm debt. 
15 
THE OUTCOME 
The 1983 Payment-in-Kind Program was the largest acreage reduction 
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program ever sponsored by the federal government. Approximately 80 
million acres were taken out of production due to PIK. In addition, 
the drought conditions experienced by the agricultural sector reduced 
productivity per acre which further added to PIK's success. As a 
result, the economic effects of the PIK program were distorted by the 
weather's influence on crop production. However, in order to obtain 
estimates reflecting PIK under normal weather conditions, the U.S.D.A. 
used regression models based on historical data to adjust actual 
figures. Therefore, PIK statistics used in this study are not actual 
figures, but merely estimates of PIK. 
Overall, PIK did reduce production as well as stocks. For 
example, corn production was reduced by 1,260 million bushels and 
ending stocks of corn declined by 83%. In addition, PIK improved 
conservation practices since approximately 77 million acres· were put 
into conserving uses, resulting in a projected 20% decline in soil 
erosion. Finally, net farm income increased by $4 billion between 
1982-83, largely due to reduced production costs, improved commodity 
prices and increased government transfers resulting from the program. 
Hence, some of the U.S.D.A.'s objectives of PIK mentioned earlier were 
successfully realized. 
Although the U.S.D.A. declared PIK a success since it reduced both 
production and surplus commodity stocks as well as increased farm 
prices and incomes, the price of success was high. The total 
administrative cost of the program alone was estimated to be $55.3 
16
million. Most of this can be attributed to the increased workload of 
the A.S.C.S. county offices which were responsible for administrating 
the program. These increased activities included such things as 
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explaining the program's provisions to farmers and farm organizations, 
accepting and reviewing contracts fram the 100% PIK option, and 
overseeing participating farmers to make sure they were complying with 
the conservation stipulations. In addition, the eee had to develop a 
system for delivering PIK commodities from eee storage facilities to 
warehouses close to PIK recipients. Due to the size of the program, 
this was an extremely difficult and time consuming task. Distribution 
was further complicated by the imbalance in government stocks. 
Warehouses to the west of the Mississippi River were filled with PIK 
commodities while most of the payments were going to farmers to the 
east of the river. For example, Nebraska had 140 million bushels of 
PIK corn more than it needed while Ohio was short by more than 45 
17
million bushels. As a result, same farmers were paid in a 
lower-grade commodity or were forced to travel two or three counties 
away to receive their PIK payments. 
One of the most significant consequences resulting from PIK was 
its adverse effects on many agricultural input industries due not only 
to the size of the program, but also to the reduced acreage 
requirements. For example, the demand for fertilizer, the most 
severely affected input, declined by nearly 18%. Furthermore, both 
energy usage and farm machinery repairs were projected to decline 12%, 
while the demand for seed was expected to fall 13%. Overall, the 
actual total expenditures for these inputs dropped by an estimated $5.2 
billion. However, input expenditures are expected to rise 
significantly in the 1984 growing season since input usage should 
increase due to fewer acres taken out of production. 
The non-farm sector was also affected by PIK through higher food 
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prices. The U.S.D.A. has predicted this increase to be only 1% , a 
very modest estimate. Realistically, this appears to be a low 
prediction since one of the basic food groups affected by PIK is meat. 
Higher feed grain prices resulting from PIK will cause livestock 
producers to reduce their livestock numbers in order to avoid higher 
production expenses. As a result, the supply of meat in the short run 
will be high as livestock owners reduce herds by sending more hogs and 
cattle to slaughterhouses. However, in the long run this supply will 
be low since the base for future production has been reduced in the 
short run. Higher meat prices and therefore, increased food prices can 
be expected in the two to three year period following the PIK program. 
SECTION III 
As has been emphasized, PIK was a type of acreage reduction 
program which had greater incentives to participate as compared to 
other acreage reduction programs. Like earlier programs, PIK payments 
were the largest for those producers who were capable of producing 
more, thus inequity did arise. In addition, the government cost of the 
program which at first was projected to be extremely low, proved to be 
one of the highest cost commodity programs sponsored by the U.S.D.A. 
Finally, PIK like earlier acreage reduction programs caused 
inefficiencies to arise since resources were not combined in a manner 
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optimal to society. It is these inefficiencies which this paper will 
now attempt to measure. 
METHOD TO MEASURE INEFFICIENCIES 
As noted earlier, the inefficiencies resulting from acreage 
reduction programs consists of two types: 1) welfare loss to society 
and 2) technical inefficiency, which together are represented by 
triangle E'ZE in Figure 3. In order to measure this total area of 
inefficiency, a demand curve and two supply curves, one representing 
free market supply where government production controls do not exist 
and the other reflecting supply affected by acreage reduction programs, 
must be determined. These curves will form two areas of 
inefficiencies. Welfare loss to society, shown by triangle E'FE, can 
be measured by ~omputing the area of the triangle. This can be found 
by simply substituting points computed by the regression model into the 
formula for the area of a triangle. The resulting equation 
representing the inefficiency due to welfare loss to society can be 
written as follows: 
(1) Area A 1/2 (E'F)(Q'Q) 
In order to find technical inefficiency represented by triangle 
E'ZF, the point where the two long run supply curves intersect, point Z 
in Figure 3, will be found by setting the two long run supply curve 
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equations equal to each other. This point of intersection can then be 
used to measure the area of triangle E'ZF by subtracting triangle FZT 
from triangle EZT: 
(2) Area B 1/2 (qQ')(P'P) - 1/2 (QQ')(PP )
f 
Total inefficiency caused by acreage reduction programs will therefore. 
be equal to the sum of the two areas. 
THE REGRESSION MODEL 
Equations for the supply and demand curves were found using an 
econometric model which causally related agricultural inputs. 
production. price. supply and demand. The model used in this study was 
applied only to the feed grain sector. This sector was specifically 
chosen because feed grains historically have been a major component of 
the federal government's surplus stocks and have been one of the basic 
commodities targeted by acreage reduction programs. Although feed 
grains used for both consumer and livestock consumption consist of 
corn, barley, sorghum and oats, they are defined in this model as only 
corn and sorghum since the federal government has focused on reducing 
the excess production of these two commodities. Therefore, feed grains 
as used in this study will include price and quantity data for· only 
corn and sorghum. The data were taken from various Agricultural 
Statistics printed annually by the Department of Agriculture. In 
addition, some figures were taken from statistical charts and tables 
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directly available from the U.S.D.A. and the Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service (A.S.C.S.). Observations were made annually 
from 1965 to 1983 with most of the 1983 numbers being figures projected 
by the U.S.D.A. The initial year, 1965, was chosen not only due to the 
availability of data, but also to the growing influence the federal 
government has had on agricultural production since this base year. 
Using this data, the demand and supply equations needed to measure the 
two areas of inefficiency were then determined using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). 
(A) INPUT EQUATIONS 
In order to determine the needed supply curves, input equations 
were estimated for selected inputs used in the production of feed 
grain. These inputs were chosen not only due to their importance in 
feed grain production, but also because of the impact acreage reduction 
programs have had on these factors of production. Others which should 
be included in this model but were not due to inavai1abi1ity of data 
are fuel and energy inputs, machinery repairs, and pesticides. 
One of the most essential inputs used in feed grain production is 
land. In this model this factor of production is used to determine not 
only the demand for the other inputs but also to compute current 
production. The equation for this input is as follows: 
where AC harvested acreage of feed grain 
LAGP = lagged price of feed grain 
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Suppose it takes two years for the supply response in the 
feed grain sector to be completed. In periods of low prices such 
as Pi and P2 , the resulting inunediate quantities are ~ and~. However, 
these low prices will not be fully reflected until two years later at Q3. 
This smaller quantity (Q1) results in a higher price, P whose effect3 , 
will not be seen until two years later at Q5. This will: continue until a 
long run equilibrium is reached at point E. 
In this regression (Equation 2) a drop in quantity in the current year 
could be represented in this figure as P increasing to P4 while quantity falls 3from Q3 to %. 
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LAGPS lagged price of soybeans 
ACDIV feed grain acreage diverted to conservation uses 
LAGAC lagged harvested acreage of feed grain 
PSUPP price support for corn and sorghum 
Last year's price of feed grain, LAGP, will help determine the amount 
of acres producers decide to devote to feed grain production. 
According to the Cobweb Theorem , farmers' decisions on the amount of 
production will depend upon last year's price. For example, if last 
year's price was high, farmers will tend to increase production in the 
current year. Similar to this is the federal price support for feed 
grains for if the current price support is high, farmers producing on 
land which can easily grow corn as well as some other crop, would plant 
corn since they are guaranteed a higher price. In addition, since 
soybeans are considered by most farmers as a substitute crop for corn, 
it can be expected that farmers would devote more acres to feed grain 
when the price of soybeans is low. 
Fertilizer has become an important input used in farming and has 
been the factor most responsible for increasing yields per acre over 
the years. The following equation will attempt to determine the demand 
for fertilizer: 
where F commercial fertilizer 
AC = harvested acreage of feed grain 
..
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PF = price of commercial fertilizer
 
LAGF lagged quantity of fertilizer
 
LAGP lagged price of feed grain
 
PSUPP = price support for corn and sorghum 
Acreage of feed grain (AC) was used in this equation as well as in the 
remaining input equations and was determined fram the previous 
regression equation. (Equation 1) It is included since the amount of 
cropland devoted to feed grain would directly influence the amount of 
fertilizer demanded by the producer. That is, if acreage of feed grain 
is reduced due to the federal acreage reduction programs, the desired 
quantity of fertilizer will decline. This decline will be only a 
fraction since farmers will increase usage of fertilizer on their 
remaining acres in order to increase productivity. In addition, the 
previous year's price of feed grains as well as their price support are 
included in all the input equations. This is due to the direct 
relationship between the previous year's price and current price 
supports and the selected inputs. For example, if last year's price or 
this year's price support of feed grain is high, farmers will want to 
increase current production by (1) increasing the number of acres 
planted, (2) increasing the use of fertilizer on the land used for 
production or (3) increasing both the number of acres planted and 
fertilizer usage. The previous year's quantity of fertilizer is 
included in the equation to reflect farmers' expectations. For example, 
if the quantity of fertilizer demanded was low in the previous year, 
producers will want more fertilizer in the current year to make up for 
the fertilizer not used on the land in prior years. 
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Like fertilizer, farm machinery has played an increasingly 
important role in the history of U.S. agriculture. Automation and 
mechanization have caused the agricultural sector to be more dependent 
upon horsepower, fuel, and size. Farm machinery usage is responsible 
for reducing both hours and work involved in agriculture, adding to the 
increase in farm productivity. These relationships are represented by 
the following equation: 
where FM farm machinery 
AC = harvest acreage of feed grain 
PFM price of farm machinery 
y total net farm incane
 
FMST farm ~achinery stock
 
LAGP lagged price of feed grain
 
INI' = interest rate
 
PSUPP price support for corn and sorghum
 
Theoretically, farm machinery is directly related to total net farm 
income since the quantity of farm machinery demanded tends to increase 
in periods of high net farm income. Likewise, interest rates are 
included in the equation since the financing of such capital 
expenditures usually involves sane type of a loan. The relationship 
between these two variables is expected to be negative for as interest 
rates rise, the number of loans will fall, and therefore, the amount of 
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farm machinery demanded by producers will decline. Furthermore. 
included in the equation is the stock of farm machinery which is found 
by the identity: 
(4) FMST = LAGFST + FM t t 
where FMST farm machinery stock 
LAGFST = lagged farm machinery stock 
PM = farm machinery 
The final input equation used in this model is the equation for 
hired farm labor. Over the years farm machinery has steadily replaced 
this input. adding to its decline. Likewise. acreage reduction 
programs have been accused by farm labor unions of accelerating this 
decline of labor in agriculture. The proposed equation for labor is: 
where L = hired farm labor 
W hourly wage 
AC harvested acreage of feed grain 
FMS = farm machinery stocks 
LAGP lagged price of feed grain 
PSUPP price support for corn and sorghum 
Wage as well as farm machinery stock is indirectly related to hired 
-36 
farm labor. It is expected that as the wage or stock of farm machinery 
rises, less labor will be demanded. 
(B)PRODUCTION AND SHORT RUN SUPPLY EQUATIONS 
Since output is dependent upon its factors of production, the 
production function for the feed grain sector proposed in this model is 
determined by these input equations. This production function can be 
represented as follows: 
where PROD production of feed grain 
F commercial fertilizer 
FM farm machinery 
L hired farm labor 
AC = harvested acreage of feed grain 
A log-linear equation such as the Cobb-Douglas production function 
might be a better equation to use, since the expected production curve 
should have diminishing marginal products, therefore reflecting 
increasing returns to scale. However, in order to ease computations 
later, a regular straight line relationship will be assumed. 
This equation which represents current production of feed grain is 
a part of the total supply of feed grain. This can be seen in the 
following equation: 
•
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(7) SUPPLY: Q = PROD + STOCKS + IMPt t t t 
where Q total quantity of feed grain supplied 
PROD production of feed grain 
STOCKS surplus stocks of feed grain 
IMP feed grain imports 
In this equation, Q is the short run total supply and will be a 
perfectly inelastic supply curve (i.e. a vertical line). 
(C) DEMAND EQUATION 
Another essential equation needed in order to measure 
inefficiencies arising from acreage reduction programs is the demand 
equation. In theory, consumers' and livestock producers' demand for 
feed grain should determine the demand curve. This equation can be 
written as follows: 
(8) DEMAND: 
where P price of feed grain 
PSUPP = federal price support for corn and sorghum 
Q = quantity of feed grain 
LAGur := lagged utilization of feed grain 
YD = consumer disposable income 
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LVST livestock production 
By shifting terms, demand can also be represented by the equation for 
price : 
(9) 
The price support for corn and sorghum will affect the price of feed 
grain directly since a high price support will more than likely cause 
the market price to be high. Likewise, a large livestock production 
level and a high feed grain utilization in the previous year will 
increase the demand for feed grains, thereby raising feed grain prices. 
On the other hand, a large total quantity of feed grain will draw feed 
grain prices down since supply exceeds demand. 
(D) DETERMINING LONG RUN SUPPLY 
The total supply curve of Equation 7 is the short run total supply 
curve. Therefore, in order to measure the two areas of inefficiency, 
long run supply curves will need to be determined. 
To compute long run total supply curves for both 
government-influenced and free market settings, it must be realized 
that an equation for the price of feed grain can be found in terms of 
last year's price of feed grain plus other predetermined exogenous 
variables. This is because input equations are all interrelated by 
..
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harvested acreage of feed grain (AC) in Equation (1). After making 
needed substitutions, this equation can be represented as follows: 
where P price of feed grain 
LAGP lagged price of feed grain 
x = exogenous variable 
An increase in any exogenous variable, say ~ , will have a 
multiplier effect on P. For example, in the first time period, an 
increase in Xl will cause P to increase by k • However, this t 2 
increase in P will cause P l also to increase in the next time periodt _t 
which in turn, causes P to increase by an additional ~ .~. Thist 
process will continue and a multiplier of k2(1/1-kl) can be computed. 
20 
Using the adaptive expectation approach to obtain a long run 
total supply curve, equation 10 can be divided by (l-kl). Next, LAGP 
can be dropped, resulting in the following equation: 
where PLR is the long run price and is a function of all the exogenous 
variables in the model. 
This estimated long run price can then be substituted into 
Equation 9. Solving for Q will give the long run quantity for total 
supply. Changing the value of one of the variables used in this demand 
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equation will result in another long run equilibrium price and 
quantity. The long run total supply curve can then be computed by 
finding a slope using these figures. 
•
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THE RESULTS 
The regression equations to be used in this model to help measure 
the inefficiencies caused by acreage reduction programs have been 
proposed. However, in most cases after running these regressions, the 
equations actually used are modified versions of these original 
equations as can be seen in Appendix I. This paper now will discuss the 
results of the regression equations used in this model and determine 
the area of inefficiency caused by acreage reduction programs. 
A. INPUT EQUATIONS 
The estimated equation for harvested acreage as initially proposed 
was as follows: 
(1.359) (1.564) (1.402) (.161) 
(1)	 ACt = 87446.99 - 4.957 LAGP 4.483 PSUPP + .358 LAGAC - 378.27 LAGPS 
- .~54 ACDIV 
(5.305) 
The absolute t-values are given in parentheses which shows that 
only ACDIV is significant at both the .05 and .10 level even though the 
independent variables explained approximately 83% of the dependent 
variable. It is interesting to note that the coefficient for ACDIV is 
less than one, supporting the earlier proposition that not all land 
diverted in acreage reduction programs is actually used for productive 
purposes. In order to obtain a better estimate for harvested acreage, 
however, last year's price of soybeans was dropped from the equation 
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which resulted the following: 
(2.255) (2.120) (1.563) (6.402) 
(2) AC = 88586.21 = 5.5386 LAGP 4.751 PSUPP + .339 LAGAC .643 ACDIV t 
-2R = .8468 
By dropping LAGPS, two additional variables, LAGP and PSUPP, became 
-2 
significant at the .05 level in addition to increasing R. However, 
although significant, the LAGP coefficient is negative, differing from 
earlier stated expectations. According to this equation, a dollar 
increase in last year's price of feed grain will cause harvested 
acreage to decrease by 5.386 million acres. This result contradicts 
with the Cobweb Theorem which the inclusion of LAGP in the equation was 
based upon, since the increase in last year's price decreases, rather 
than increases, harvested acreage. Other regressions tried, however, 
yielded similar results. 
A possible explanation of this negative coefficient could be the 
variable itself. Perhaps the delayed response needed for the Cobweb 
Theorem to hold is greater than one year, say two or three years. 
Therefore, the coefficient for the first lagged price variable may be 
negative, meaning that harvested acreage decreases with an increase in 
the previous year's price, but rises when the longer lagged price 
increases. This long run equilibrium "zoning in" can be seen in Figure 
21 
4 where an increase in feed grain price lagged two years actually 
increases current harvested feed grain acreage, while the one year 
lagged price causes a decrease. Although this maya plausible 
explanation, it must be noted that the negative coefficient for LAGP 
also could be due to the model's small number of observations as well 
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as to inaccurate data. In addition, price of feed grain was 
unintentionally expressed in current rather than constant dollars. 
Therefore, incorrect coefficient signs could be caused by the presence 
of inflation in the model. Despite this imperfection, Equation 2 was 
used in the model as the estimate for harvested acreage. 
The equation for fertilizer as originally proposed was estimated 
as follows: 
(4.8) (.117) (.029) (1.130) (1.632) 
(3)F = -196.37 + .173 AC .077 PSUPP - .006 LAGF - .563 LAGP + 62.74 PF t 
-2R = .6464 
According to this equation, AC is the only significant variable and has 
a positive effect on fertilizer as is expected. However, a few 
unsupported inconsistencies did result from the regression which are 
reflected in coefficient signs for PSUPP, LAGP, and PF contrary to what 
was expected. For example, Equation 3 states that a one dollar 
increase in the price of fertilizer, other things constant, would cause 
the demand for fertilizer to increase by 62.736 thousand tons. 
Clearly, this contradicts one of the basic economic theories which 
. 
states that there exists a negative relationship between price and 
quantity oemanded. Due to these theoretical disagreements and also to 
the insignificance of these variables, the regression was ran without 
these three variables which resulted: 
44 
(5.573) (.851) 
(4) F = 9682.083 + .130 AC + .307 psupp
t 
"R2 = .6345 
Although the [2 is slightly smaller, the coefficients appear to be 
theoretically correct since an increase in acreage or the level of 
price support would be expected to cause an increase in the demand for 
fertilizer. Therefore, despite the loss	 of three variables from the 
originally proposed equation, Equation 4	 was used in the model as the 
estimate of the demand for fertilizer. 
The earlier suggested equation for the demand for farm machinery 
was estimated as follows: 
(1.062) ( .139) (.766) (.351) 
(5) FM = 5132.42 + .021 AC + .08 psUPP .03 LAGY + 15.71 INT 
t 
-.319 LAGP - 87.275 FMST + .024 PFM 
(1.212)	 (1.016) (.328) 
"R2 = 0 
Like Equation 3, theoretical contradictions did result, in this case 
for the variables LAGY, INT, LAGP and PFM. For example, according to 
this equation, if the current interest rate increases while other 
variables remain constant, the demand for farm machinery will increase 
by 15.706 units. This contradicts with the negative relationship 
between investment and interest rate as stated in general economic 
theory. Three possible explanations for this inconsistency are (1) a 
wrong interest rate was used in this model, (2) the assumed financing 
relationship between interest rate and farm machinery does not exist, 
..
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and/or (3) data used were inaccurate. The interest rate used in this 
model was the prime lending rate, a relatively short run rate. Perhaps 
an intermediate or longer term interest rate would have yielded better 
results. In addition, farm machinery was believed to be financed 
through bank loans when the actual financing could perhaps be better 
accounted for through some other method such as monthly payments to the 
farm implement store. Finally, farm machinery defined in this model 
was composed of those machines which could be directly traced to only 
feed grain production (i.e. grain combines and corn pickers). 
Therefore, tractors and other motor vehicles, a very large part of farm 
machinery, were excluded from the model which may be a possible reason 
for the weak equation. 
Another variable which is inconsistent is LAGY, the total net farm 
income from the previous year. According to Equation 5, other things 
constant, a one dollar increase in last year's total net farm income 
would decrease the demand for farm machinery by .03 units. However, 
demand theory states that an increase income will increase the demand 
for the product. Again, this can be attributed to insufficient and/or 
inaccurate data. 
A more plausible equation for farm machinery was found using the 
two most significant variables in the earlier proposed equation which 
were harvested acreage and the previous year price of feed grain: 
(.419) 
(6) FM t = -1538.098 + .004 AC 
•
 
46 
In this equation, both the explanatory variables are insignificant at 
the .05 or .10 level, therefore resulting in a low coefficient of 
determination. Also, LAGP is negative which contradicts earlier 
expectations that an increase in the previous year's price of feed 
grain, other variables constant, will increase the demand for farm 
machinery in the following year since farmers will want to increase 
production. Although this contradiction exists, it was the best 
estimate which could be obtained given the data. 
The final input equation used in the model was for hired farm 
labor which as originally proposed was: 
(1 •.548) (.526) (.401) (.985) 
(7) L = -3606.045 - 42.717 w+ .013 AC + 39.267 FMST + .558 LAGP t 
+ 1.906 psupp 
(1.644) 
Despite the insignificance of all the variables, the coefficient signs 
for the explanatory variables are correct according to earlier 
expectations, except for FMST. According to economic theory, an 
increase in capital should decrease labor. Instead, in this equation, 
it increases labor by approximately 39 laborers for everyone million 
dollar stock increase. One possible explanation for the insignificant 
variables found in this equation besides possible data problems, is 
the fact that hired farm labor in the feed grain sector is not as an 
important factor of production as that found in the citrus as well as 
in other sectors of agriculture since feed grain production is 
extremely capital intensive. Another possibility is that since labor 
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used in the feed grain sector consists more of non-wage, family workers 
22 
as compared to hired labor ,a better equation might be obtained by 
using data for total family workers. If this was the case, wage would 
not be included in the equation since family labor is not considered 
hired labor. 
Other regressions were run leaving the most insignificant 
variables out of the equation. These attempts did not yield a better 
equation since none of the variables were found to be significant. In 
fact, some regressions which were tried, changed coefficient signs 
which could not be fully explained. Therefore, because a better 
equation could not be found, Equation 7 was used in the model as the 
estimate for labor. 
B. PRODUCTION EQUATION 
These input equations were used to find production which was 
estimated using the following equation: 
( .543) (.774) (.110) (.232) 
(8) PROD = 1201.784 - .533 FM + .048 AC .081 L + .096 F t 
Because none of the explanatory variables are significant, the 
coefficient of determination is zero. Furthermore, both PM and L are 
negative which means that according to this equation, these inputs 
cause a decrease in production rather than an increase as was expected. 
Again, these inconsistencies can possibly be explained by inaccurate 
data as well as an insufficient number of observations. In addition, 
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some of the variables may be incorrectly used. For example, FMST 
instead of FM could give a better estimate since the farm machinery 
stock will also be used in feed grain production. Another possibility 
is the fact that other inputs such as seed, fuel and pesticides were 
not included in the equation. Perhaps by including these inputs, a 
better equation could be obtained. Finally, as mentioned earlier, a 
log-linear approach used to estimate production would probably result 
in a better equation since production usually resembles a curve more 
than a straight line. However, even though these imperfections did 
arise from this equation, it was still used in the model as an estimate 
for production. 
c. DEMAND EQUATION
 
Demand was determined using the price of feed grains as the
 
dependent variable : 
(.494) (.677) (1.941) (1.313) (2.24) 
(9) Pt = -7550.32 - .25 PSUPP + .013 LVST + .383 LAGUT .172 Q + 1.610 YD 
2Although this equation had a high R , PSUPP was negative. According 
to the earlier discussion on the secondary effects of supply control 
measures using price supports, the price of feed grain should increase 
as the level of price support rises. However, Equation 9 states that a 
$1 increase in price supports will cause the feed grain price to fall 
by $.25, a very unlikely amount. 
A better equation was obtained by dropping PSUPP as well LVST, 
..
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resulting in the following: 
(1.676) (3.679) (3.304)
(10) P = -5058.562 + .298 LAGUT - .274 Q + 1.803 YO t 
In this equation, all the explanatory variables are significant at the 
.10 level. Furthermore, the coefficient signs for all the variables 
correctly correspond to economic theory. This equation represents 
short run price which can be used to eventually find the long run 
equilium price as shown in Figure 5. 
D. DETERMINING LONG RUN SUPPLY 
In order to obtain Equation 10 in terms of all the exogenous 
variables so that the long run supply curves can be found, this 
procedure was followed: 
(1) the equation for harvested acreage was substituted into each 
of the other input equations; 
(2) these expanded input equations were substituted in the 
production equation; 
(3) this newly formed production function was substituted into 
the demand equation. 
This expanded equation for feed grain price can be expressed as 
follows: 
FIGURE 5
 
PRICE
 
QUANTITY
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= -5239.44 - .1599 LAGP + .0922 PSUPP - .00414 LAGAC + .00785 ACDIV 
-.94804 W+ .87132 LAGFST - .274 STOCKS - .274 IMP + .298 LAGUT 
+1.803 YD 
The relationship between the important variables, PSUPP, ACDIV, LAGP, 
and P are all positive which what was expected according to economic 
theory. 
Using the adaptive expectation model, this equation was divided by 
1.1599 and LAGP was dropped, yielding the following: 
=	 -4517.148 + .0795 PSUPP - .00357 LAGAC + .00677 ACDIV 
-.8173 W+ .751 LAGFST - .2362 STOCKS - .2362 IMP 
+ .2569 LAGUT + 1.5.54 YD 
Equation 12 is the estimate for the long run price. By substituting 
price obtained in this equation into the demand equation and solving 
for Q, a long run quantity corresponding to this price was determined, 
therefore giving one point on the long run supply curve. However, two 
points are needed to find the slope and the resulting equation of a 
line. 
To find a second point on the long run supply curve, demand was 
shifted by increasing the value of YD used in Equation 12. Both long 
run price and quantity were found in the same manner as the first point 
was determined. Connecting these two points then yielded the long run 
supply curve which is graphically shown in Figure 6. 
The free market supply curve was found following exactly the same 
S' 
FIGURE 6 
S 
D (YD t = $4016) 
QUANTITY OF 
FEED GRAIN 
TABLE I 
YD = $4016 YD = $4050 
Price Price~uantity ~uantity($7bUY Mil. bu.) ($75UY Mil. bu.) 
Real World 2.85 4657.2) 2.90 4698.65
 
Free Market 2.75 5022.19 2.79 5100.11
 
PRICE OF 
FEED GRAIN 
$2.85
 
$2.75
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procedure as that for the supply influenc'ed by production controls 
except the value for both ACnIV and PSUPP was zero since these policy 
provisions would not exist in a free market setting. 
The results from these two procedures, using the mean values 
obtained from the given data for the exogenous variables, are seen in 
Table 1. The relationship between these two supply curves as well as 
the inefficiencies of acreage reduction programs are shown in Figure 7. 
E. MEASURING INEFFICIENCIES 
The purpose of this research paper was to measure the two areas of 
inefficiency caused by the implementation of federal acreage reductions 
programs. Now that equations for both supply and demand of feed grain 
have been determined, the procedure to compute the two areas of 
inefficiency described earlier will be followed. 
The welfare loss to society, represented by triangle E'FE in 
Figure 8, was found using the equation for the area of a triangle. 
Using the point-slope formula, P was found to be $2.57. 
Inefficiency represented by Area A was determined as follows: 
Area A 1/2 (E'F)(Q'Q) 
1/2 (.28)(364.9577) 
$51.094 million 
To find the technical inefficiency represen~ed by triangle E'ZT in 
Figure 9, the point where the two supply curves intersect (point Z) was 
found by setting the two supply equations equal to each other. Price at 
point Z was found to be $1.54 while quantity is 3569.1928 million 
FIGURE 7 
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FEED GRAIN 
s 
p' 
Q' Q 
QUANTITY OF 
FEED GRAIN 
FIGURE 8 
PRICE OF 
FEED GRAIN 
s 
p' 
p 
Q Q' 
QUANTITY OF 
FEED GRAIN 
•
 
52 
bushels. Subtracting the smaller triangle, FZT, from the larger 
triangle, E'ZT, resulted the measurement for technical inefficiency. 
This was determined as follows: 
Area E' ZF= Area E' ZT - Area FZT 
1/2 (QQ')(P'P) - 1/2 (QQ')(P'P ) 
= 1/2 (1088.04)(1.31) - 1/2 (1088.04)(1.03) 
= $712.664 - $560.339 
$152.325 million 
Using these numbers as the welfare loss to society and technical 
inefficiency estimates, total inefficiencies caused by acreage 
reduction programs was found by simply adding the two smaller 
components as follows: 
Total Inefficiency = Area A + Area B 
= $51.094 + $152.325 
$203.419 million 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to measure the inefficiencies caused 
by federal acreage reduction programs and to use this measurement to 
support the view that free market policies would be more efficient. 
Using an econometric model applied to the feed grain sector, a 
measurement of inefficiency was found. However, the validity of this 
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estimate is questioned due to problems with some of the regression 
equations used in the model. Because the reliability of this 
measurement is not known, the inefficiency estimate does not support 
the free market positon as much as was anticipated. 
Three regressions used in the model were not good equations for 
the dependent variable since none of the explanatory variables were 
significant and some of the coefficients had signs contradicting 
economic theory. These three weak equations existed for the variables 
FM, L, and PROD. Data problems are the most likely reasons for these 
weak equations. Because not all data were specifically for the feed 
grain sector, some inaccuracies could have developed. In addition, 
some variables such as INT and L, had more than one set of data 
depending on the way the variable was defined in the model. 
Insignificant variables could result if the wrong definition and 
therefore, the wrong data for the variable was used. This could also 
be caused by failing to deflate all variables in the model as in the 
case for price of feed grain. Furthermore, some variables which should 
have been included in a few of the equations were left out due to 
insufficient data. These equations may have been stronger if data were 
found so that these variables could be included in the regression. 
Finally, the number of observations used in this model may have been 
inadequate, therefore, not allowing the true relationship between the 
variables to be found. 
Although the model was flawed by these three weak equations, a 
measurement of inefficiency still was able to be computed. It was 
found in this model that technical inefficiency caused by commodities 
being produced at a cost to society higher than that found in a free 
..
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market, was approximately three times greater than the welfare loss to 
society. However, this relationship between these two inefficiencies 
can not be considered a reliable one due to the model's inclusion of 
the weak input equations for farm machinery and hired farm labor, which 
both affect the supply curves' slope. Given set demand and free market 
supply curves, technical inefficiency will be greater than welfare loss 
to society as the slope of the real world supply curve falls, thereby 
becoming flatter. This relationship is shown in Figure 10. Therefore, 
since the slopes of the supply curves are questionable due to the 
shortcomings of the FM and L equations, the relationship between the 
two inefficiencies can not be considered true. 
Likewise, due to the errors found within the model, the total 
inefficiency measurement can not be considered a reliable estimate of 
the true inefficiency resulting from acreage reduction programs. It 
was found that from 1965-1983, total inefficiency caused by these 
supply control measures created inefficiencies equal to approximately 
$203 million. This is a very low and therefore, unrealistic estimate 
considering the size of acreage reduction programs and the feed grain 
sector during this time period. Clearly, this measurement of 
inefficiency caused by government production controls applied to the 
feed grain sector does not strongly support the free market position of 
abolishing acreage reduction programs. However, this measurement and 
therefore, this paper, does prove that inefficiencies, although small, 
do arise from acreage reduction programs implemented by the federal 
government. 
•
 
APPENDIX I 
To show how much greater PIK's cash benefits were compared to other 
acreage reduction programs, a hypothical situation will be considered. 
Suppose a farmer with a corn acreage of 1,000 acres is trying to decide 
whether to enroll in just the Reduced Acreage Program (RAP) or in both RAP 
and PIK. His farm program yield is 120 bushels per acre and the paid land 
diversion payment is $1.50 a bushel. If the target price for corn is 
$2.86/bu. and the market price per bushel is $3.10, the following comparison 
can be made: 
RAP 
Acreage base (ac) 1,000 
Farm program yield (bu/ac) 120 
% of acreage base diverted 20% 
Paid land diversion payment $ 18,000 
(100 ac x $1.50 x 120 bu/ac) 
Production of remaining acres $288,000 
(800 ac x $3.00 x 120 bu/ac) 
Total Gross Income $306,000 
Less: Production expenses (168,000) 
(800 ac x $1.75 x 120 bu/ac) 
Net Farm Income $138,000 
10-30% PIK 
Acreage base (ac) 1,000 
Farm program yield (bu/ac) 120 
% of acreage base diverted 50% 
Paid land diversion payment $ 18,000 
(100 ac x $1.50 x 120 bu/ac) 
Additional 30% diverted 89,280 
(300 ac x .80 x 120 bu/ac) 
Production on remaining acres 186.000 
(500 ac x .80 x 120 bu/ac) 
Total Gross Income 283,280 
Less: Production expenses (105,000) 
(500 ac x $1.75 x 120 bu/ac) 
Net Fann Income $178,280 
II 
100% PIK 
Acreage base (ac) 
Farm program yield (bu/ac) 
% of acreage base diverted 
1,000 
120 
100% 
Paid land diversion payment 
(100 ac x $1.50 x 120 bu/ac) 
$ 18,000 
Additional 80% diverted 
(800 ac. x .80 x 120 bulac x $3.10) 
238,000 
Total GrosslNet farm Income $256,080 
Therefore, assuming the maximum whole-bid of 80%, the 100% PIK option would 
provide the most cash benefits. 
-ENDNOTES 
(1) Geoffrey S. Shepperd, Farm Policy: New Directions (Ames: Iowa 
State University Press, 1964), p. 9. 
(2) This section is based upon material taken from American Farm 
Policy, 1948-1973 (University of Minnesota Press, 1976) by Willard 
COchrane and Mary E. Ryan and Foundations of Farm Policy (University of 
Nebraska Press, 1970) by Luther Tweeten. 
(3) Don Paarlberg, Farm and Food Policy--Issues of thje 1980's 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1980), p. 20. 
(4) Originally, the basic commodities were defined as cotton, wheat, 
corn, rice, tobacco, hogs, and milk. 
(5) Roy Ewell, Floyd Corty and Gene Sullivan, Economics--App1ications 
to Agriculture and Agribusiness (The Interstate Printers &Publishers, 
Inc., 1975), p. 16. 
(6) Cochrane, p. 32. 
(7) Hendrik S. Houthakker, Economic Policy for the Farm Sector 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, November 1967), p. 25. 
(8) The following numbers are taken from Shepperd, p. 9. 
(9) With the help of Dr. Robert Leekley, this figure was based upon 
work done by Luther Tweeten in "Agricultural Policy: A Review of 
Leglislation, Programs, and Policy," Food and Agricultural Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1977), p. 104. 
(10) The following numbers are taken from Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, "U.S. 
Farm Programs come Under Attack as Their Cost Soars," The Wall Street 
Journal, November 10, 1983, p. 1. 
(11) The ideal of PIK was not new as it was a payment option used in 
thje Feed Grain Act of 1961. However, what was new, was the size of 
PIK payments and the extensive crop coverage of the program. 
(12) FOR is a program in which farmers may hold wheat or feed grains 
off thje market for three or more years and have their commodities 
financed by loans from the CCC. Storage payments are made to these 
farmers by the CCC. In addition, FOR loans carry a higher loan rate 
than CCC nonrecourse loans and are applicable for a longer period of 
time. 
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(13) United States Department of Agriculture, Initial Assessment of PIK 
(Washington, D.C., April 1983), p. 6. 
(14) Acreage base is determined from historical planting practices and 
is used to compute the allowable planting and acreage diversion acres. 
(15) The following numbers which are not specifically footnoted are 
taken from Operational Aspects and Market Effects of the 1983 
Payment-in-Kind Program (Washington, D.C., February 1984), p. 5. 
(unpublished material) 
(16)	 Some expenses include the following: 
new form printing and distribution $6.5 million 
travel cost and training 2.7 million 
(17) Meg Cox and Betsy Morris, "Distribution of PIK Causing Big 
Headaches for U.S. and Farmers," The Wall Street Journal. October 14, 
1983, p. 31. 
(18) The following figures were taken from Operational Aspects and 
Market Effects of the 1983 Payment-in-Kind Program, p. 58. 
(19) See Mordecai Ezekiel, "The Cobweb Theorem," The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, February 1938, p. 250-275. 
(20) Damodar Gujarati. Basic Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1978). p. 265. 
(21) This figure was taken from Ezekiel, Figure 4, p. 267. 
(22) See Table 575, Aaricultural Statistics 1983, p. 400. 
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